Basic rights claims How responsive is ‘reasonableness review’? by Sandra, Liebenberg
ESR Review vol 5 no 57
FEATURE
foundational values should guide the
Court to an approach whereby
government is given a margin of
appreciation to formulate and
implement these socio-economic
commitments and be held
accountable for them. In this way, the
Court continues to be a forum in
which those most in need can
engage with government and thus
ensure that government is forced to
account to them for the manner in
which it has decided to respond to
its constitutional obligations.
This form of accountability must
be distinguished from political
accountability, which depends upon
the manner in which a government
is elected and, if so provided in a
constitution, recalled. But that is a
matter of political design and the
exercise of popular sovereignty in
the way elections take place.
By contrast, a constitution like
South Africa’s introduces another
form of accountability in terms of
which the government owes a
fidelity to the preservation and
promotion of the very basic
cornerstones of the society of which
it has been elected. The government
is required to fulfil certain
constitutional obligations, including a
commitment to some key distribu-
tional issues as prefigured in the
socio-economic rights sections of the
Constitution.
That government may seek to
fashion a particular response in the
image of its own core policies is one
thing. But that it remains
accountable to those who are the
beneficiaries of these basic commit-
ments is a separate consideration. It
is with regard to the latter that the
court plays a vital role as a
transmission belt between the
government of the day and the
constituencies who seek to rely on
these most basic of commitments.
Conclusion
If the role of the Court remains solely
at the level of analysis of the invoked
right without being a watchdog for
litigants who want to exercise their
full citizenship, the promise of socio-
economic rights may remain at the
level of the worst of negative rights
– the right to assert without any
meaningful remedy.
In turn, the greater the gap
between uplifting promises of the
Constitution and the degrading
realities of South African life,
admittedly inherited from hundreds
of years of racist rule, the more
significant the impact upon the very
legitimacy of the constitutional
community born but a decade ago.
Dennis Davis is a judge of the
Cape High Court.
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If life on earth was such that people could easily provide for their
needs and develop and protect their capacities, perhaps disputes
about how to live and how to organise society could emphasise the
heights to be attained and ignore the depths of misery to be avoided,
but in our world, minimal standards are indispensable. (James W.
Nickel, 1987.)
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution (the Constitution) iswidely renowned for its holistic, inclusive Bill of Rights. A
particular innovation is its inclusion of a wide range of fully
justiciable socio-economic rights. There is now a burgeoning
body of jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court (the Court)
interpreting these rights. There can be little doubt that South
African jurisprudence has given a significant boost to
international endeavours to protect socio-economic rights.
Through its jurisprudence, the
Court has to achieve a critical
balance between effectively
protecting the socio-economic rights
of the poor, while also respecting the
roles of the legislature and executive
as the primary branches of
government responsible for realising
socio-economic rights.
In its most recent decision of
Jaftha v Schoeman and Others CCT
74/03, 8 October 2004 (Jaftha), the
Court gave effect to its earlier
indications that it would strongly
protect people against negative
invasions of socio-economic rights. In
Government of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
(Grootboom), the Court held that the
first subsection of section 26 (and by
implication, section 27) imposed “at
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the very least, a negative obliga-
tion…upon the State and all other
entities and persons to desist from
preventing or impairing the right of
access to housing” (at para. 34).
Section 26(1) enshrines the right of
access to adequate housing and
section 27(1) entrenches the rights
of access to health care services,
sufficient food and water, and social
security.
Jaftha concerned the cons-
titutionality of provisions of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act, which
permitted the sale in execution of
people’s homes in order to satisfy
(sometimes trifling) debts. The Court
accepted the appellants’ arguments
that measures that permit a person
to be deprived of existing access to
housing constitute a negative
violation of the right of access to
housing. This negative violation is not




in section 26(2). Instead
any justification offered
by the State for the
violation falls to be
determined in terms of
the general limitations
clause (section 36).
The Court did not
find it necessary to
delineate all the circumstances in
which a measure will constitute a
violation of the negative obligations
inherent in socio-economic rights.
One can anticipate that given the
strong protection accorded to them,
the scope of these negative duties
will be an area of contestation in
future litigation.
However, it is in the area of the
positive duties imposed on the State
by the socio-economic rights
provisions that the Court is con-
fronted most starkly with the di-
lemma of how far it should go in re-
viewing the policy, legislative and
budgetary choices of the legislature
and executive. The landmark cases
that established the foundations of
the Court’s jurisprudence on the
positive duties imposed by the socio-
economic rights provisions are
Soobramoney v Minister of Health,
KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR
1696 (Soobramoney), Grootboom,
and Treatment Action Campaign
and Others v Treatment Action
Campaign and Others 2002 (10)
BCLR 1033 (CC) (TAC).
The model of
reasonableness review
The Court has rejected the notion
that the socio-economic rights pro-
visions in the Constitution impose a
direct, unqualified duty on the State
to provide social goods and services
on demand. It has done this in the
context of arguments
raised by the amici
curiae (‘friends of the
court’) interventions in
Grootboom and TAC.
The amici sought to
persuade the Court to
adopt the notion of
“minimum core obliga-
tions” developed by the
UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) in its General Comment
No. 3 (GC3, The nature of State
parties’ obligations, article 2(1) of
the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
para. 10). In TAC, the Court rejected
an interpretation of socio-economic
rights that would “give rise to a self-
standing and independent positive
right enforceable irrespect-ive of the
considerations mentioned in section
27(2)” of the Constitution (para. 39).
The Court voiced a number of
concerns regarding the concept of
minimum core obligations. These
included practical issues concerning
the definition of the rights in the
context of varying social needs
(Grootboom, paras. 32–33), the
impossibility (according to the Court)
of giving everyone access even to a
“core” service immediately (TAC,
para. 35), and its incompatibility with
the institutional competencies and
role of the courts (TAC, paras. 37–
38). However, the Court did indicate
that evidence in a particular case
might show that there is a minimum
core of a particular service that
should be taken into account in
determining whether the measures
adopted by the State are
reasonable (Grootboom, para. 33
and TAC, para. 34).
The Court has instead adopted a
model of reasonableness review for
dealing with the positive duties
imposed by the socio-economic
rights provisions. The central question
that the Court asks is whether the
means chosen are reasonably
capable of facilitating the realisation
of the socio-economic rights in
question. In the words of the Court:
A Court considering reason-
ableness will not enquire
whether other more desirable
or favourable measures could
have been adopted, or
whether public money could
have been better spent. The
question would be whether the
measures that have been
adopted are reasonable. It is
necessary to recognise that a
wide range of possible
measures could be adopted by
the State to meet its
obligations. Many of these
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reasonableness. Once it is
shown that the measures do so,
this requirement is met.
(Grootboom, para. 41.)
The assessment of the reasonable-
ness of government’s programmes is
influenced by two factors. First, the
internal limitations of section 26(2)
require that the rights may be
“progressively realised” (Grootboom,
para. 45), and that the availability of
resources is “an important factor in
determining what is reasonable”
(para. 46). Second, reasonableness
is judged in the light of the social,
economic and historical context, and
consideration is given to the
capacity of institutions responsible
for implementing the programme
(Soobramoney, para. 16 and
Grootboom, para. 43).
The standard of scrutiny
employed by the Court is more
substantive than simply enquiring
whether the policy was rationally
conceived and applied in good faith.
Thus, in the Grootboom and the TAC
cases, the Court set the following
standards for a reasonable
government programme to realise
socio-economic rights:
• the programme must be
comprehensive, coherent, co-
ordinated (Grootboom, para. 39–
40);
• it must balanced and flexible and
make appropriate prevention for
short-, medium- and long-term
needs (para. 43);
• it must be reasonably conceived
and implemented (para. 40–43);
and
• it must be transparent, and its
contents must be made known
effectively to the public (TAC,
para. 123)
However, the element of the
reasonableness test that comes
close to a threshold requirement is
that the programme in question must
cater for those in urgent need:
To be reasonable, measures
cannot leave out of account,
the degree and extent of the
denial of the right they
endeavour to realise. Those
whose needs are most urgent
and whose ability to enjoy all
rights is therefore most in peril,
must not be ignored by the
measures aimed at achieving
realisation of the right. It may
not be sufficient to meet the
test of reasonableness to show
that the measures are capable
of achieving a statistical
advance in the realisation of
the right. Furthermore, the
Constitution requires that
everyone be treated with care
and concern. If the measures,
though statistically successful,
fail to respond to the needs of
those most desperate, they
may not pass the test.
(Grootboom, para. 44.)
This requirement of the reason-
ableness test is justified particularly
in terms of the value of human dignity
(Grootboom, para. 83).
In Grootboom, the otherwise
rational, comprehensive housing
programme was faulted for its failure
“to provide relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over
their heads, and who are living in
intolerable conditions or crisis
situations” (para. 99). In TAC, the
Court held that the failure to extend
the provision of the anti-retroviral
drug, Nevirapine (described as “a
simple, cheap and potentially
lifesaving medical intervention”) to
prevent mother-to-child transmission
of HIV throughout public health care
facilities in South Africa, was
unreasonable, and hence a breach
of the right of access to health care




The model of reasonableness review
gives the Court a flexible and
context-sensitive tool in relation to
socio-economic rights claims. On the
one hand, it allows government the
space to design and formulate
appropriate policies to meet its
socio-economic rights obligations.
On the other hand, it subjects
government’s choices to the
requirements of rationality, inclusive-
ness and particularly the threshold
requirement that all programmes
must provide reasonable measures
of relief for those whose circum-
stances are urgent and intolerable.
Government has the latitude to
demonstrate that the measures it has
adopted are reasonable in the light
of its resource and capacity con-
straints and the overall claims on its
resources. The Court has made it
clear that although its orders in
enforcing socio-economic rights
claims may have budgetary im-
plications, they are not “in themselves
directed at rearranging budgets”
(TAC, para. 38).
The important point is that
government will have to justify its
policy choices when they impact
detrimentally on people’s access to
socio-economic rights, and these
justifications will be scrutinised by the
Court. This promotes, to borrow
Etienne Mureinik’s words, “a culture
of justification”.
But does the Court’s
jurisprudence do enough to protect
vulnerable groups who face an
absolute deprivation of minimum
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essential levels of basic socio-
economic goods and services? This
category of claimants is in danger of
suffering irreparable harm to their
lives, health and sense of human
dignity if they do not receive urgent
assistance. In addition, if their urgent
needs are not met, there is no
foundation for the progressive
improvement in their living stan-
dards. For example, once the harms
of malnutrition and a deprivation of
adequate early childhood education
have been suffered, progressive
improvements in the provision of
these services cannot undo the
damage to those affected.
It is useful in this regard to
distinguish between the two interests
protected by socio-economic rights
identified by David Bilchitz. The first
is the more basic interest in survival
and non-impaired functioning. The
second is a more extensive interest
(which includes the minimal one) in
“being able to live well” (D Bilchitz,
Giving socio-economic rights teeth:
The minimum core and its
importance, (2002) 118 South African
Law Journal at 484 at 490). The
latter interest extends beyond mere
survival and meeting of basic needs.
This distinction allows us to recognise
that there are differences between
the two interests, “and that the
minimal interest has an urgency and
must be prioritised in a way that the
maximal interest does not” (at 491).
The Court’s model of
reasonableness review has been
criticised for not catering adequately
to this group of claimants. Thus, for
example, the Court has indicated
that not everyone who is deprived of
basic services will have an
entitlement to claim immediate relief
from the State (Grootboom, paras.




The Court’s review standard could
be strengthened to offer greater
protection to those claimants who
lack access to a basic level of social
services. First, vulnerable litigants
seeking access to basic socio-
economic services would benefit
from having the burden of proving
the reasonableness of government’s
programmes placed on the State.
Thus, in situations where a vulnerable
group is excluded from
accessing a basic social
service, the duty would
be on the State to justify
why the exclusion is
reasonable in the
circumstances.
In terms of practical
litigation, individual liti-
gants currently bear a
difficult burden of proof
to illustrate that govern-
ment programmes are
unreasonable. They are
required to review the whole
panoply of government pro-
grammes and assess their reason-
ableness in the light of the resources
available to the State and the
latitude of progressive realisation
that it enjoys. The alternative pro-
posed above would give individuals
the benefit of a presumption of
unreasonableness in circumstances
where they cannot gain access to
basic survival needs.
Second, requiring a compelling
government purpose for failing to
ensure that all have access to basic
needs could strengthen the review
standard. Government should be
required to show that that its
resources are “demonstrably in-
adequate” (GC3, para. 11) for
meeting basic needs in the light of
other compelling government
purposes. This would require placing
both evidence and arguments
before the Court regarding why its
budgetary resources are inadequate
to ensure a basic level of social
provisioning to all. The Court would
be required to scrutinise the
evidence and arguments closely with
a view to assessing whether they
present a compelling justification for
failing to provide basic needs.
The final element that should
strengthen the Court’s review stan-
dards in respect of basic
needs is the inclusion of a
more vigorous propor-
tionality analysis. The
Court comes close to
including such an an-
alysis by its threshold
requirement that a
government programme
will be found unreason-
able if it does not make
provision for those in
desperate need. How-
ever, the Court has also
indicated that this does not
necessarily imply that all in
desperate need should receive relief
immediately, but only “a significant
number” (Grootboom, para. 39).
The inclusion of a stronger pro-
portionality analysis would require
government to show that there are
no less restrictive means of achieving
its purposes than limiting access to
essential levels of the socio-
economic rights, and that other less
restrictive measures have been
considered. Thus, even if the State
can make a compelling case that it
is not possible to provide everyone
with a basic level of service
immediately, it should also be
required to show that other ‘lesser’
forms of provision have been
considered. In addition, it must show
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of basic needs, and devising
programmes and strategies for
remedying the situation. The views of
the CESCR in this regard are
instructive:
The Committee wishes to
emphasise, however, that even
where the available resources
are demonstrably inadequate,
the obligation remains for a
State party to strive to ensure
the widest possible enjoyment
of the relevant rights under the
prevailing circumstances.
Moreover, the obligations to
monitor the extent of the
realization, or more especially
of the non-realisation, of
economic, social and cultural
rights, and to devise strategies
and programmes for their
promotion, are not in any way
eliminated as a result of
resource constraints….Similarly,
the Committee underlines the
fact that even in times of
severe resource constraints
whether caused by a process
of adjustment, of economic
recession, or by other factors
the vulnerable members of
society can and indeed must
be protected by the adoption
of relatively low-cost targeted
programmes. (GC3, paras.
11–12.)
It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss the question of remedies.
Suffice to say that the nature of the
remedies handed down by courts
should be informed by the urgent
nature of the interests at stake and
the danger of claimants suffering
irreparable harm if they do not
receive immediate relief. The courts
should be willing to grant orders of
interim individual relief to litigants
serious denial of human dignity to
neglect to do so. It also undermines
society’s efforts to build an inclusive,
caring political community. As
expressed by Justice Mokgoro in the
case of Khosa, Mahlauli and Others
v Minister of Social Development and
Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC):
Sharing responsibility for the
problems and consequences
of poverty equally as a
community represents the
extent to which wealthier
members of the community
view the minimal well-being
of the poor as connected with
their personal well-being and
the well-being of the com-
munity as a whole. In other
words, decisions about the
allocation of public benefits
represent the extent to which
poor people are treated as
equal members of society.
(Para. 74, footnotes omitted.)
The stronger review standard
proposed above will ensure respect
for the dignity and equal worth of
the poor within the model of
reasonableness review developed
by the Court. It requires a higher
degree of justification from the State
in respect of basic needs claims, but
does not impose inflexible standards
nor demand the impossible.
Prof. Sandra Liebenberg is the
H.F. Oppenheimer Chair in
Human Rights Law at
Stellenbosch University and is
the founder and former co-
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Law Centre, University of the
Western Cape.
pending government’s adoption of a
comprehensive programme for
ensuring access to the various socio-
economic rights. In addition, in cases
of this nature, the courts should be
willing to exercise a supervisory
jurisdiction to ensure that adequate
progress is made in designing
effective remedial programmes.
Conclusion
The Court has developed a model of
reasonableness review for ad-
judicating the positive duties imposed
by socio-economic rights. Of par-
ticular importance is the element of
the reasonableness test that en-
quires whether the state has made
short-term provision for vulnerable
groups in desperate need and living
in intolerable conditions. This model
of review has given the courts a
flexible, context-sensitive tool to
adjudicate positive socio-economic
rights claims. It allows the Court to
respect the role and competencies
of the other branches of government
– the democratically-elected
legislature and the executive – while
not abdicating its responsibilities to
enforce the positive duties imposed
by socio-economic rights.
However, this paper has argued
that the justificatory elements of the
reasonableness test should be
tightened when dealing with
situations where vulnerable groups
are deprived of basic essential levels
of social goods and services. A high
standard of justification is warranted
in this category, given the nature and
urgency of the interests at stake.
Members of groups who are
deprived of basic socio-economic
needs face severe threats to their life,
health and future development.
When a society has the resources to
provide basic levels of socio-
economic rights, it constitutes a
